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Working paper
Aspiring to Succeed: A Model of Entrepreneurship and Fear of Failure
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Working paper
The fragility of deterrence in conflicts
In: Journal of theoretical politics, Band 27, Heft 1, S. 43-57
ISSN: 0951-6298
The fragility of deterrence in conflicts
In: Journal of theoretical politics, Band 27, Heft 1, S. 43-57
ISSN: 1460-3667
We study deterrence in sequential move conflicts, modeled as a contest. We bias the model in favor of peace by assuming that under complete information deterrence is achieved and peace prevails. We show that under incomplete information about states' types (resolve) the chances of deterrence decrease rapidly. Studying a uniform type distribution, we show that the finer the type space becomes the more resolve a defending state must have to support deterrence in equilibrium. In the limit, as types occur on a continuum, deterrence is possible only under relatively extreme conditions.
Do Polls create Momentum in Political Competition?
We explore how public opinion polls affect candidates' campaign spending in political competition. Generally, polls lead to (more) asymmetric behavior. Under a majority rule there always exists an equilibrium in which the initially more popular candidate invests more in the campaign and thereby increases her lead in expectation: polls create momentum. When campaigning is very effective and the race is very close, a second type of equilibrium may exist: the trailing candidate outspends and overtakes his opponent. Regardless of the type of equilibrium, polls have a tendency to decrease expected total campaigning expenditures by amplifying ex-ante asymmetries between candidates and thus defusing competition. When candidates care also for their vote share in addition to having the majority, candidates' incentives crucially depend on the distribution of voters' candidate preferences.
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Do Polls Create Momentum in Political Competition?
In: EPSA 2013 Annual General Conference Paper 230
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Do Polls Create Momentum in Political Competition?
In: University of St. Gallen, School of Economics and Political Science, Discussion Paper No. 2013-26
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The Fragility of Deterrence in Conflicts
In: U. of St. Gallen Law & Economics Working Paper No. 2013-16
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Imperfect Property Rights: The Role of Heterogeneity and Strategic Uncertainty
In: University of St. Gallen Department of Economics Discussion Paper No. 2010-27
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The Ponds Dilemma
In: The economic journal: the journal of the Royal Economic Society, Band 128, Heft 611, S. 1634-1682
ISSN: 1468-0297
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On the Merits of Meritocracy
We study career choice when competition for promotion is a contest. A more meritocratic profession always succeeds in attracting the highest ability types, whereas a profession with superior promotion benefits attracts high types only if the hazard rate of the noise in performance evaluation is strictly increasing. Raising promotion opportunities produces no systematic effect on the talent distribution, while a higher base wage attracts talent only if total promotion opportunities are sufficiently plentiful.
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Do People Who Care About Others Cooperate More? Experimental Evidence from Relative Incentive Pay
In: Harvard Business School Strategy Unit Working Paper No. 16-040
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Left Behind Voters, Anti-Elitism and Popular Will
In: Quarterly journal of political science: QJPS, Band 19, Heft 2, S. 127-156
ISSN: 1554-0634
Left Behind Voters, Anti-Elitism and Popular Will
In: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper 2020-055/VII
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